(abstract)
The paper empirically tests the proposition that because of the unequal social distribution of politically relevant resources, some groups of citizens may be less successful in expressing their specifically political preferences in the vote than others. Hence, the electoral arena may give different people different degrees of political influence even when the formal equality of all citizens before the law is rigorously upheld in the electoral process. Survey data on voting behavior from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and Larry Bartels's (1996) simulation procedure -now extended to the analysis of multiparty-systems and nonlinear information effects on the vote -are utilized to explore the question. The results show that social differences in political knowledge may lead to the hypothesized political inequalities but their size is remarkably modest.
Where to find the paper? Bartels' simulation procedure
Step 2: Use the respondents' true socio-demographic characteristics and the parameter estimates from the vote function to estimate the probability that respondents i vote for each party j at the actually observed values of the Knowledge variable (falling somewhere between 0 and 1), and in the hypothetical situation when the respondents' observed information level is replaced with Knowledge=1.
Step 3: Derive fully informed votes from the estimated probabilities.
Step 4: Sum up the difference between simulated (fully informed) and observed votes to determine (A) how many individuals would have voted differently if they had become fully informed and (B) how much the election results would have changed.
What is wrong in Bartels' analysis?
Inferences are made about particular elections in history using a highly counter-factual simulation. In the real world, if such a sea change occurred in citizens' information level, then parties/candidate would surely adjust their behavior in ways that are hard to anticipate. Inferences are made about the percentage of individuals who would change their vote if they became fully informed. This is wrong because these estimates (A) assume that the vote function perfectly modeled vote choices and (B) are dependent on the arbitrary selection of what full information level is.
What one can do instead
Steps 1 and 2: Use the same vote function and estimate the probability that respondents i vote for each party j at the actually observed values of the Knowledge variable (falling somewhere between 0 and 1), and in the hypothetical situation when the respondents' observed information level is replaced with Knowledge=1
Step 3: Derive fully informed election outcomes from the estimated probabilities: the one that would obtain (A) if Knowledge remained unchanged; and the one that would obtain (B) if everyone's Knowledge raised to various hypothetical values but everything else remained the same. Note that this only assumes that the vote function included all shared determinants of vote choice and Knowledge.
Estimating voter inequality
Step 4: Derive these estimates for various (in my analysis 90) socio-demographic groups (defined, in my analysis, in terms of gender, age, education and income).
Step 5: Use the Pedersen-index (Σv i -ύ i ) to calculate the difference between simulated (fully informed) and observed election outcomes in these social groups.
Step 6: Regress the information-induced change at the group level (observed across a wide range of elections) on the observed mean of Knowledge in the group. The results at the national level T a b le 2 : E s t im a t e d P e r c e n t a g e C h a n g e in E le c t i o n O u t c o m e U n d e r D if f e r e n t H y p o t h e t i c a l S c e n a r i o s o f C h a n g e i n V o t e r s ' I n f o r m a t io n L e v e l P r e s u m e d in f o r m a t i o n le v e l 1 f o r e v e r y o n e a t le a s t . 6 5 A u s t r a lia 1 9 9 6 2 1 . 1 5 . 3
C z e c h R e p u b l ic 1 9 9 6 1 6 . 5 3 . 6 G e r m a n y ( W e s t ) 1 9 9 8 9 . 7 1 . 4 G e r m a n y ( E a s t ) 1 9 9 8 8 . 1 4 . 9 H u n g a r y 1 9 9 8 2 1 . 3 5 . 8
J a p a n 1 9 9 6 3 9 . 8 1 2 . 1 M e x ic o 1 9 9 7 1 4 . 3 1 . 1
T h e N e t h e r la n d s 1 9 9 8 1 5 . 7 5 . 1 N e w Z e a la n d 1 9 9 6 1 4 . 5 5 . 8
N o r w a y 1 9 9 7 1 4 . 2 3 . 3
